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Public day care centers in Chile have increased in 240% between 2005 and 2007. This paper
uses this huge increase in public day care supply for infants of poor families to analyze its impact
on Female Labor Force Participation. The magnitude of the expansion is used as a quasi-natural
experiment, where diﬀerent geographic areas and income groups were aﬀected diﬀerently. Using
mean diﬀerences I ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on Labor Force Participation of 2.6-10 percentage points
which coincides with previous ﬁndings for Chile and the local policy common sense. After control-
ling for observable individual and family characteristics I don’t ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect for the
eligible mothers. As a robustness check I also use alternative outcome measures like employment
and hours of work and I am not able to ﬁnd a positive statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Therefore,
I conclude that it is not possible yet to infer that this policy has had this desired eﬀect.
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Chile is one of the Latin American countries with better educational coverage: primary school is
almost universal (94%) and secondary school reaches a coverage of 81%. Eﬀorts in this area have
been focused in quality, access to secondary education and lately coverage of preschool education.
Chilean data from 2006 (Source: CASEN, 2006.
1) show that only 6 percent of infants (two
years or less) attend a nursery and 26.5 percent of children between two and three years attend
a day care. These low average attainment rates are also very unequal through income levels,
reaching, for example, only 3% in the ﬁrst income quintile among infants. In this context, the
Chilean government set itself the goal of providing an integrated protection system for early
childhood (Sistema de Protecci´ on Integral de la Infancia). The main objective is to provide equal
development opportunities to all infants. Therefore the main focus of infant policies has been the
complementarities between diﬀerent public policies like health, schooling and community services.
As soon as the Bachelet administration took oﬃce, it organized a “Presidential Advisory
Council for Infant Policies”. The premise is that every child is born with the same capabilities,
but there is a strong eﬀect of the socioeconomic environment on the physical and neurological
development during the ﬁrst eight years of life. Therefore, the Council’s proposal included many
policies directed to protect infant development and equalize learning conditions. One of the ef-
fects of this Council’s work has been to considerably increase the public child care supply for the
poorest households. The main objective is to provide equal opportunities to children, starting
at a very early age. This increase is done either by direct administration of new facilities, or
by public ﬁnancing of private suppliers. Between 2005 and 2007, there has been an increase of
240 percent in the number of day care centers.
2 The commitment is to increase nursery spots
by 70,000 and toddlers by 43.000 between March 2006 and December 2009. Considering nursery
spots were numbered at 14,400 in 2005, it will imply a 486% expansion (by December 2007, there
were 44,600 infant spots implying a 200% expansion). Hence, there is a public policy that sharply
increases the number of spots available for poor preschool children in a scale that has never been
seen in Chile.
Even though the policy was implemented mainly due to the concern about the children’s
development conditions, this paper focuses on the potential impact in the labor market. Chile
has particularly low female labor participation even for its level of development. Female labor
force participation currently reaches 43% and is known to be an important factor in reproducing
poverty. I want to measure the potential impact this policy could have on the labor market. Us-
ing data from the national household survey (CASEN) we observe that there has been a steady
increase in the female labor participation over time. However, it still remains at low levels in
comparison with other Latin American countries. On average, we are at a similar level than
Costa Rica and Mexico, and well below the rest of the region.
Nonetheless, the low female participation rates hide striking diﬀerences depending on the
poverty level, education and household composition. Low income females have a participation
rate of 33 percent. On the other hand, high income females have European level participation
rates, reaching 72 percent. Additionally, almost 50 percent of poor females that do not work,
mention the care of their children as the primary reason. Hence we could expect to ﬁnd a positive
impact on the working status of women aﬀected by the policy, although as previously explained,
the policy was designed with the objective of child development. If I ﬁnd a positive impact of
public day cares it could lead to additional policy recommendations related to the labor market
and would give additional support to a continuing expansion of the program.
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of this substantial increase
in public child care supply on the labor force participation of poor females with children, as has
1I thank the Ministry of Planning of Chile for the access to this data.
2By the end of 2005, there were 708 public day care centers. During 2006, the government opened 800 new day care
centers and during 2007, 900 additional centers for poor children (lowest 2 quintile of income distribution).been found in international literature. This paper adds to the literature that explores the female
labor supply eﬀects of expansions in subsidy programs for toddlers and preschoolers. For instance,
Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2005) ﬁnd a positive impact on the maternal labor force as a result
of the expansion in the public day care subsidy program in Quebec. Similarly, Schlosser (2006)
ﬁnds a positive impact of the public preschool expansion in Israel. Berlinski and Galliani (2007)
look at the eﬀect of a large expansion on pre-primary school facilities in Argentina for children
aged 3-5 between 1994 and 2000, and also ﬁnd a positive impact on maternal employment.
Even though, this question has been previously addressed by diﬀerent authors, the huge ex-
pansion of the public day care supply in Chile, motivated by a policy decision directly on child
health issues and supported politically by the election of a female president, gives us the ad-
vantages of a quasi-natural experiment to examine this question. It is specially interesting to
analyze this expansion because it aﬀects infants between 0 and 2 years of age, where cultural and
health factors may be more restrictive. In my preferred speciﬁcation I ﬁnd no eﬀect on Female
Labor Force Participation (LFP). Despite previous evidence, the results do not show a labor
force expansion due to this policy. Considering all the new vacancies are being used and there are
still an important fraction of children on waiting lists, we might be in presence of a substitution
of child care arrangements. There is also the possibility that cultural and religious principles
among poor households in Chile make this country particularly inelastic to this type of policy. As
Contreras and Plaza (2004) establish, there is a strong negative relation between cultural values
of the head of household and spouse, and their disposition with respect to female labor partici-
pation and child care arrangements. Unfortunately I will only be able to test the substitution of
day care arrangement hypothesis with the next national household survey (November 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the research done
on the eﬀects of child care policies upon female labor force participation. Section 3, describes
the existing public day care providers, and the expansion policy, as well as the application and
selection criteria, used in the public centers. Section 4 describes the data set used, presents the
main descriptive statistics for the analysis, and also presents the main characteristics of public
day care users. It also describes the child care availability indicators constructed for this study.
Section 5 describes the empirical strategies used to estimate the impact on female labor force
participation and explains the alternative robustness checks used in this paper. Section 6 presents
the main results with the whole sample, and the alternative robustness check. Finally, Section 7
summarizes the main ﬁndings.
2 The Literature of Child Care and Labor Force Par-
ticipation
There has been a wide literature studying the determinants of Female Labor Force Participation
(LFP). In relation to the eﬀect of young children on the labor supply decision, there are three
diﬀerent types of studies. The ﬁrst group includes the child care cost as one more determinant in
the labor supply decision and extracts the marginal eﬀect. A second group simulates the impact
of diﬀerent public policies considering the elasticities obtained from the ﬁrst type of studies. The
last group of studies evaluates the impact of actual policies being implemented. In some cases
the policy considers a public subsidy for private arrangement of child care, and in other cases
the policy consists of direct public supply. This essay would be classiﬁed in this last group with
an attempt to measure the impact of the Chilean expansion in public supply of day care for infants.
The ﬁrst group of studies look at the child care cost as a determinant of female labor supply.
Blau and Currie (2004) have a good survey of studies that estimate the female labor supply elas-
ticity with respect to child care prices. Amazingly, this estimation varies between -0.36 and 0.06.
However most of the studies included in this review do not take into account the public provision
of day care. Using a tabulation from the panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP, Spring 1999) they ﬁnd that three quarters of employed mothers use some type of child
3care arrangement for children between 0 and 4 years, compared with a third of non-employed
women. Even though children of non-employed females attend non-parental care less hours per
week (16-20 hours vs. 35 hours) it is still an important amount of time. This is consistent with
a U-shape pattern with respect to income found in child care attendance, meaning poor and rich
families are more likely to use day care, than middle income households. Additionally they have
an interesting review of the potential eﬀect of increased non-parental care on ameliorating early
disadvantage children.
The second group of studies uses available data and estimations to simulate the possible eﬀects
of alternative public policies. For example, Bord´ on (2007) uses the traditional Chilean household
survey, CASEN, to characterize the determinants of female labor supply. She restricts the sample
to heads of households between 25 and 39 years of age. Considering the total number of chil-
dren and a question about who takes care of the children, she is able to construct a measure of
available day care facilities. Considering a probit estimates, she predicts that under the event of
doubling the day care supply, female labor force participation would increase by 5.7 percentage
points (13%). This is a very signiﬁcant eﬀect considering the low participation rates Chile exhibits
(43.3% in 2006). Using a specially designed survey directed toward measuring the potential use
of day care facilities, Bravo, Contreras, and Puentes (2008) simulate the impact of extending day
care beneﬁts to children of all dependent employees. They separately estimate the participation
and wage equations and combine these results with family preferences obtained from the special
survey. They ﬁnd that a subsidy of approximately 100 US Dollars with a co-payment of 35 Dol-
lars, would increase female labor force participation by 15-20 percentage points. This is a large
eﬀect.
The third group of papers that study the impact of day care on Labor Force Participation
analyzes the impact of actual policies. For example, Cascio (2006) analyzes the eﬀect of the
introduction of subsidized kindergarten in public schools on maternal labor supply. She uses the
variation over time and across state in the United States of America to identify the eﬀect. She is
able to document a large positive eﬀect for single women whose youngest child is at least 5 years
old. For every ten spots created, three single mothers entered the labor force. There appear to
be no eﬀect on single mothers with younger children or married women. Schlosser (2006) takes
advantage of the introduction of a free public preschool program in Israel. The author ﬁnds an
expected sharp increase in the attendance of children at the preschool facilities and also a signif-
icant positive eﬀect on the labor supply of the more educated mothers. An additional advantage
is that the policy change was introduced in diﬀerent towns at diﬀerent times, which allows her
to have control towns. It is important to consider that this program aﬀects children of 3 and 4
years, where there might be less social resistance to enroll the children. With a similar method-
ology, Berlinski and Galliani (2007) measure the impact of the expansion of pre-school facilities
on attendance and maternal employment in Argentina, ﬁnding similar results.
On the other hand, Gelbach (2002) uses the quarter of birth of the children as an instrument
of the year they are allowed to attend public schools. Once they are able to attend a public school
for free, it reduces the cost of working for their mothers since they would be able to work without
paying for day care. He also ﬁnds signiﬁcant eﬀects on mothers’ labor supply.
An alternative strategy has been developed in the context of limited public day care subsidies.
In this case it is possible to compare the behavior of mothers that were able to join the program
with the behavior of those on the waiting lists. For example, Berger and Black (1992) use data
from the Kentucky subsidies programs, and ﬁnd a positive impact on hours worked as well as on
the quality of the day care used.
Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2005) also analyze the impact of the expansion in child care
subsidies in Louisville and Kentucky. Using a sample of enrolled families and mothers on the
waiting list, they ﬁnd a positive impact on the likelihood of single mother’s employment and care
quality. However they ﬁnd little impact on hours worked. Considering the characteristics of the
comparison group they isolate the subsidy eﬀect from other possible eﬀects like the sign-up and
4waiting list eﬀect. They additionally ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on child care quality for mothers of
children in the program.
Similarly Duﬂo (2001) uses a huge school construction program as a measure of new facilities
for children to measure the long-run impact on their total years of schooling and their labor
market wage after ﬁnishing school. In this case the policy change is for children over 5 years and
she also ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive eﬀects.
The diverse results documented in the literature make it even more important to use the op-
portunity given by the Chilean policy change to analyze the potential impact on Labor Force Par-
ticipation. As mentioned before, it is possible that I do not ﬁnd any eﬀect because there might be
substitution between informal and formal day care arrangements, that I am not able to observe yet.
This may be because there is a strong cultural resistance as mentioned by Contreras and Plaza
(2004), or because the socio-demographics of Chile have high levels of income inequality extremely
correlated with inequality in educational achievement. Hence, I may be observing a version of the
result found by Schlosser (2006) for Israel and Berlinski and Galliani (2007) for Argentina (which
is a country with an older tradition of education across strata).
3 The Public Day Care Policy
In Chile we have two public providers of Day Care. In 1970, the Frei administration created the
“Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles” (National Council of Child Care, JUNJI) which is a public
institution in charge of planning, creating, promoting and controlling the appropriate operation of
day care centers. Their mission is to provide quality nursery, infant and toddler care to poor and
vulnerable children. For that purpose they can directly manage the day care centers or delegate
the administration to non-proﬁt organizations. This institution provide services nationwide and
therefore has a national management team and regional directors.
Curiously, there is another public provider which is the non-proﬁt organization “Fundaci´ on
INTEGRA” that was created in 1990, as part of the ﬁrst lady’s initiatives during the Aylwin
administration. As of today, it has a national council deciding their policies. Similar to JUNJI
its mission is to provide quality education to infants up to 5 years of age.
Both institutions have the explicit focus of providing quality day care and not remaining as
a simple custody place for children. Although, presumably there are some underlying historical
political reasons for the existence of two institutions, for my purpose there does not seem to be
any relevant diﬀerence.
3.1 Expansion Policy
As mentioned before, the Bachelete administration decided to strongly expand the number of day
care facilities and their capabilities. The commitment implies more than doubling the number of
centers available over a three-year time period.
The expansion policy has varied slightly over years. The ability to decide where to increase
day care facilities the ﬁrst period was limited by the ability to adjust the existing budget. We need
to remember that the new administration took oﬃce in March 2006, when the ﬁscal year budget,
with its items, was already decided and approved by the congress the previous year. Nonetheless,
during 2006, JUNJI increased by 320 the number of classrooms for infants between 0 and 2 years.
INTEGRA, made a similar number of new classrooms available. This ﬁrst expansion was made
mostly by refurnishing old classrooms that were used by Pre-Kinder and Kinder children, since
these levels are now oﬀered in school buildings. Therefore an important part was the reconversion
of existing facilities. Additionally, they made use of already-approved local funds at the county
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facilities was therefore given by this resource constraint.
By the end of 2006, both institutions worked together at the national level to analyze the
distribution of the new facilities for 2007. The expansion should cover 25,000 new vacancies,
20,000 of them for infants from 0 to 2 years and the remaining 5,000 for toddlers starting at 2
years up to 3 years 11 months.
For this purpose, they worked on setting up a uniﬁed data set containing information, at the
national, regional and county level, about:
• number of children younger than 3 years and 11 months;
• number of children in the lowest to income quintile and by poverty status;
• coverage taking into account only the formal provision of day care (The support provided to
family day care facilities will not be taken into account for this purpose, since this program
has not been expanded); and
• shortage computed as the diﬀerence between poor children in the ﬁrst income quintiles and
coverage oﬀered by both institutions, measured as absolute value and percentages.
Finally, they combined three indicators of scarcity into and index [with their corresponding
weight]:
• shortage of spots for the ﬁrst two income quintiles [0.8];
• shortage of spots considering poverty status [0.17]; and
• Human Development Index computed by the United Nations [0.03].
all of them ranging between 0 and 1.
Considering this information they constructed a Priority Index to distribute the assigned spots
across regions.
With this criteria, the Metropolitan Region (Santiago), was actually the one with more short-
age and therefore over 8,000 of the 20,000 new spots for infants and 2,000 of the 5,000 spots for
toddlers where assigned in the capital. Taking into account the income levels, the coverage for
infant care declared by these institutions is 12 percent at the national level.
By the end of 2007, the professionals of both institutions agreed to improve the indicators of
the previous year, using a new data set available: the Survey about Health and Life Quality ap-
plied by the Ministry of Health during 2006. The advantage of taking into account this survey is
that it inquires about the potential demand for day care. It shows that two thirds of poor females
(non-users) would not send their infants to day care even if it would be available. Therefore,
the potential shortage of day care is reduced to a third. This is an important distinction since
the promise is to make day care available to everyone who wants to use it, but there will not be
mandatory attendance. Hence, to have full coverage for infants they estimate a shortage of 48,000
spots. Once again the Metropolitan Region had the highest shortage and therefore received 5,600
of the 16,000 spots assigned.
Once the expansion policy has been determined at the national level, assigning the number
of spots and classrooms to be constructed in each region, the local authorities within each region
decide where to construct them. In this process they are limited by the availability of public land
and their ability to sign agreements to delegate the administration of new centers to non-proﬁt
organizations.
For the 2009 process, they are geo-coding the centers and therefore trying to build the new
ones where there is higher potential demand.
63.2 Application and Selection Criteria
Since 2006, the application to any government program by a family requires a Social Protection
Score Card (Ficha de Proteccion Social, FPS). In order to obtain this score, a member of the
family needs to ask for the initial interview in their local county. A social worker will visit the
house and perform a structured interview. She registers all the household members, their age,
health problems, educational level, employment status, monthly incomes of the last year, and the
housing characteristics. Afterwards, all this information is registered in a national database that
assigns a score. The advantage of this procedure is that it does not only consider special health
needs and actual family incomes but also their ability to generate income in the future (as proxied
by education levels).
Starting in September of each year, there is a period of advertising the existing day care fa-
cilities. The centers inform about the application dates, the time schedule and the requirements.
The application for the upcoming year is open during the months of November and December.
To apply, the person in charge of the child has to ﬁll out a form that inquires about the data
of the child and the person in charge, and then the person proceeds to an interview with the
social worker to detect speciﬁc risk situations, providing some documents like birth certiﬁcate,
Social Protection Score, employment or study certiﬁcate, etc.
3 The information about family
composition, household characteristics and income is summarized in the Social Protection Score.
Even though the public day cares are theoretically open to any child, the scarcity of vacancies
forces them to use certain selection criteria. The instrument they have used has varied over years,
however, the basic criteria is having less than 11,734 points in the Social Protection Score Card
(which is highly correlated with the ﬁrst two income quintiles). For all the families that meet the
score criteria, the additional criteria used are:
• children belonging to vulnerable families measured as belonging to the Chile Solidario
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program;
• children of the day care workers;
• children whose mother is head of household;
• children whose mother works, studies or is searching employment;
• children whose mother is an adolescent;
• children of native ethnic families; and
• children that do not have an adult to look after them during the day.
These data are managed at the local level and families with higher scores get priority to use
the available spots. The selection process ﬁnishes the third week of January and the results are
published the last week of January.
Once the child has been accepted, the mother or person in charge has to declare the schedule
requirements and conﬁrm the enrollment of the child. They are allowed to apply for a time ex-
tension if the mother or person in charge works. However, the time extension is not guaranteed
and single mothers might need to complement the public day care with other types of arrange-
ments if they want to work. Most day care hours are from 8:30 AM to 3:30 PM, while most
employment hours are from 9:00 AM to 6:00 PM. It is very important to keep in mind these
schedule discrepancies since they could be a cause for the absence of results that I document. To
conﬁrm enrollment they have until the last week of March. During the rest of the year the day
care director may contact families on the waiting list if they have a new vacancy.
3In previous years information about family members and income was also provided. However, with the new database
of the Social Protection Score Card the application form has been simpliﬁed.
4Chile Solidario is a Social Protection Program implemented by the Lagos Administration to help families living in
extreme poverty to receive public support in terms of subsidies and preferential access to government programs.
74 Data and Stylized Facts
I obtain the data about the public day care centers from the public providers JUNJI and INTE-
GRA. From those institution I was able to obtain the list of day care available by December of
2005, 2006 and 2007, with their addresses and the number of spots each one of them oﬀered for
infants between 3 months and 2 years.
Additionally, I use the National household survey (CASEN) to characterize female behavior
in the Chilean labor market. This specially sheds light on the participation rates by income levels
and the most common child care provider.
Finally, I require employment data at some point before the policy was implemented and
thereafter. Given we are still in an expansive period, I take the last available employment data.
This requirement precludes me from using the national household survey (CASEN) or the Social
Protection Survey (EPS) from 2006. Therefore the best option is to use the Employment and
Unemployment Survey (2003-2008) for Greater Santiago for June of each year. It has a sample
size of 3,000 households with almost 10,000 individuals each time.
4.1 Characteristics of Eligible Families
A well know stylized fact is that participation rates are lower among low income families. However,
the diﬀerences are more important among women than men in Chile. Table 1 shows that the
average Labor Force Participation for females is 43.3% and for male is 72.7% in 2006. The female
participation monotonically increases with income from 27.6% in the ﬁrst quintile to 60% in the
highest quintile. While high-income women more than double the participation rate of low-income
women, among men the diﬀerence is around 28%.
Table 1: Participation rates by gender and income quintile
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5 Total
Female LFP 27.6% 35.9% 43.4% 51.7% 60.0% 43.3%
Male LFP 60.9% 70.4% 74.4% 77.9% 79.5% 72.7%
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006.
When the non-working women are asked about the main reason, almost 50% of them report
the care of the children and over 26% reports household duties (see Table 2). Almost 10% are
still studying and around 5% are not interested in working. However, when I compare the reasons
across income levels, the most striking diﬀerences appear for Do not have child care and Not
interested in working. This last factor is considerably smaller among poor families. Not having
child care is the most prominent reason not to work, reaching almost 50% of the responses.
Therefore, I could expect an eﬀect on labor supply of providing free public day care to low
income families.
Table 2: Main reason not to work for women by income quintile
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5 Total
Do not have child care 47.7% 52.4% 47.4% 54.2% 35.2% 48.7%
Household work 30.4% 23.8% 26.2% 24.5% 24.2% 26.8%
Student 9.3% 10.0% 13.8% 5.4% 11.3% 9.8%
Not interested in working 2.9% 5.0% 5.0% 7.6% 15.2% 5.3%
Other reason 9.7% 8.8% 7.6% 8.3% 14.2% 9.4%
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006.
Additionally, I observe that low income families not only have lower education level, but also
average a higher number of young children and lower day care attendance. On average 6.1% of
8infants attend nursery and 26.3% of toddlers attend day care (see Table 3). This is more striking
for low income infants, where we observe that only 3% of them attend a formal nursery compared
to a 13% among high income families.
Table 3: Family characteristics by income quintile
Quantile 1 Quantile 2 Quantile 3 Quantile 4 Quantile 5 Total
Nursery (0-2 years) 3.0% 6.3% 5.1% 8.0% 13.1% 6.1%
Child Care (2-4 years) 23.6% 19.8% 29.2% 29.3% 39.1% 26.3%
Number of children under 2 2.01 1.86 1.69 1.61 1.45 1.75
Average Schooling 7.80 8.65 9.32 10.39 12.51 9.63
HH monthly Labor Income 256 531 786 1,225 3,346 1,128
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006.
As a ﬁrst step, I will look at the diﬀerent patterns of infant-related statistics and compare
the behavior along income levels. I will also look with more detail at who is actually using the
centers. Considering 99% of women with children under 2 years are less than 45 years old, I will
focus the analysis on the 15-45 age group.
As we can see in Table 4 Chilean families report that the mother is the main care provider,
followed by grandparents, other relatives and day care (72.6%; 12.7%; 4.4% and 4.6%). However,
the mother’s role appears to be more relevant among the poorest families, where the mother is
the main care provider in 82.7% of the cases. It appears, according to this survey that day care is
the main source of care provision for only 4.6% of the infants. However, if we inquire about the
fraction that attends formal day care we observe that almost 6% of the infants attend day care.
This varies from a 3% in the lowest income quintiles to 13% among high income families. This is
much higher than what is reported as the main care provider, which is an interesting discrepancy,
consistent with widespread part-time day care attendance (that, as I have speculated above, may
be behind my results).
Table 4: Main care provider by income quintile
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
Mother 82.7% 76.8% 67.7% 64.8% 54.3% 72.6%
Father 0.8% 0.6% 1.2% 0.7% 1.3% 0.9%
Grandfather/Grandmother 9.4% 13.0% 17.3% 14.3% 12.1% 12.7%
Other Relatives 2.5% 4.0% 4.9% 3.5% 2.2% 4.4%
Nanny 0.1% 0.2% 1.3% 4.6% 13.8% 2.6%
Day Care 2.9% 3.2% 3.2% 7.1% 11.1% 4.6%
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006.
Finally, I want to learn more about the mothers of infants that attend public day care. We
observe that users of public day care have lower average income and education. For instance, 75%
of public day care mothers have, at most, a high school education, while over 75% of mothers of
other day care centers have, at least, a high school education.
Table 5: Mothers between 15-45 years old of children attending day care
INTEGRA JUNJI Other Day Care
Average Schooling 11.00 11.39 13.85
Average Annual Labor Income 4,401 5,,447 9,598
Average Family Labor Income 7,585 9,490 22,288
Average Quintiles 2.69 2.62 3.74
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006.
9While public day care users average an annual labor income of 4,900 dollars, users of other
day cares almost double that income (see Table 5). Similarly, considering family labor income
we observe that non-public users more than double the average income. However, we need to
consider that the explicit policy of providing public day care only to the poorest families (ﬁrst
two quintiles) has not been fully respected. This might be due to income under-reporting in order
to obtain social beneﬁts, or to endogenity: once they get the children into day care they are able
to work and increase personal and household income. There might also be misreporting in the
JUNJI case, because this institution also certiﬁes private care providers.
4.2 Employment Survey Descriptive Statistics
To perform the estimations, employment data were required at some point before the policy was
implemented and thereafter. Given we are still in an expansive period, I take the last available
period of employment data. This requirement precludes me from using the national household
survey (CASEN) or the Social Protection Survey (EPS) from 2006, since there is still no survey
wave after the reform started. Therefore my best option is to use the Employment and Unem-
ployment Survey (2003-2008) for Greater Santiago.
The Employment and Unemployment Survey for Greater Santiago has been taken by the De-
partment of Economics of the University of Chile since 1957, and has been ﬁnanced by the Central
Bank of Chile.
5 It is the oldest consistent survey in Chile and one of the oldest in Latin America.
It is taken quarterly with an approximate sample size of 3,000 households with almost 10,000
individuals. The objective is to be able to compute the number and fractions of the population
that belong to the labor force by age, gender, economic activity and income. Additionally it
inquires about the characteristics of the labor force that has not been able to ﬁnd employment.
The survey has a very simple questionnaire asking about family members, their relation with
the head of household, age, schooling employment status, house rental and sources of income.
6
The employment section allows us to distinguish between workers searching for a job the ﬁrst
time, unemployed, and those working without payment. They also mention the main reasons for
not searching a job. Unfortunately, child care is not a tabulated answer. Since the survey was
designed in the 1950’s, it is very unlikely that this was a major issue back then.
The Employment Survey will allow us to observe the trends that the female labor force par-
ticipation has had over the last years. For example, even though aggregate female labor force
has been increasing over time, the behavior has been heterogenous among diﬀerent age groups,
family compositions, etc.
Table 6: Labor Force Participation by gender
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Women 53.63% 52.70% 55.83% 56.76% 55.02% 56.95%
Men 78.30% 78.29% 79.07% 76.83% 76.64% 77.66%
Source: Employment Survey of Greater Santiago
From Table 6, we can observe that male labor force participation has been more or less stable
around 78% over the 5-year period. However, female labor force participation is much lower, even
though it has increased around three percentage points over the last ﬁve years (from 53.63% to
56.95%). The numbers are consistently higher than with the National Survey, since it considers
only Greater Santiago, and also there are diﬀerences in phrasing of the employment questions.
5I thank the Central Bank of Chile for the access to this data.
6Income modules are only available in March and June each year.
104.3 Child Care Data
The list of day care available by December of 2005, 2006 and 2007, with the number of spots
each one of them oﬀered for infants between 3 months and 2 years, is obtained from the public
providers JUNJI and INTEGRA.
7 As we can see in Table 7 there was an important expansion in
centers and spots oﬀered for infants between 2005 and 2006, and it has continued during 2007,
consistent with the policy change described in Section 3.
Table 7: Evolution of day care centers and spots in the Metropolitan Region
JUNJI INTEGRA TOTAL
Number Spots Number Spots Number Spots
of centers of centers of centers
2005 96 3,420 36 1,186 132 4,606
2006 136 4,989 89 2,353 225 7,342
2007 168 6,085 112 3,061 280 9,146
Source: Public Day Care Providers
Sample restricted to 34 counties in the Metropolitan Area
In order to better understand the magnitude of the day care expansion, I computed the
number of spots with respect to the number of eligible children. As we can see in Table 8, more
than 50% of the children belong to the lowest two income quintiles. In particular, the number
of infants in the Metropolitan Region is 157,000 of which 78,000 are in the lowest two income
quintiles. Even though the public supply of day cares more than doubled in the last three years,
the coverage increased from 6.5% in 2004 to 12.8% in 2007, considering all the eligible infants in
the Metropolitan Region. When I restrict it to Greater Santiago it increases to 13.8%.
8 Therefore
it still remains at a very low level. Table A.1 shows that there is a high dispersion in coverage
across counties, going from 6% to over 70% in diﬀerent counties (Lo Espejo and Providencia
respectively).
Table 8: Number of children by income level in the Metropolitan Region
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
Less than 2 years 35,398 43,244 26,453 27,195 25,435 157,725
Percentage 22.4% 27.4% 16.8% 17.2% 16.1% 100.0%
Source: National Household Survey, CASEN 2006
Sample restricted to the Metropolitan Region
4.4 Child Care Availability Indicators
The public day care expansion policy might have an impact on a mother’s participation if it
actually makes free day care available and therefore reduces the reservation wage. Availabil-
ity should not only be deﬁned by the existence of open spots, but also by whether parents can
actually use them. Hence, we should consider a free public day care is available if it is either
close to the mother’s home or to her work. If it is far from both places, it is almost like it is
not available. However, over 90% of the children attending a day care do so in there home county.
9
7I thank INTEGRA and JUNJI for the access to this data.
8The number of centers and spots at the county level are in Table A.1. It also shows the coverage at the county
level considering as eligible families, those belonging to the ﬁrst two income quintiles.
9Even though there is no formal restriction to the day care center for which the mothers can apply, there is an implicit
policy to accept only application forms from the home county. This information was obtained from the interview with
the social worker of the Metropolitan Regional Oﬃce. The only exception is Providencia, a high income county where
there opened one day care center, given the high concentration of commerce.
11Considering the characteristics of the available data, I need to construct a measure of day care
availability that allows me to proxy for the real distance. Since I am still not able to relate the
household address to the day care, I will use the county as the reference unit (Santiago is divided
into 34 counties called comunas). I will compute two alternative measures: the total number
of spots for infants in each county relative to the number of eligible infants; and the number of
centers relative to the county area. To do so I also use data from the Ministry of Housing about
county extension, in order to have a proxy of dispersion of the centers.










Consistent with the day care data presented before, the Availability Indicators are increasing
over time, reaching an average coverage of 17% in the restricted sample, as we can see in Table 9.
Table 9: Distribution of Child Care Availability Indicators
Year Spots per eligible infant Centers per km2
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
2005 8.73% 0.07 22.06% 0.19
2006 13.45% 0.08 37.04% 0.29
2007 16.99% 0.10 46.98% 0.35
Source: Author’s calculations based on Public Day Care data.
In Table A.2 we have the details of eligible infants relative to total infants in each of the 34
counties of the Metropolitan Area. The concentration of eligible children varies between 8.1%
and 76.8% (Las Condes and El Bosque, respectively).
5 Empirical Strategy
This paper studies the Labor Force Participation eﬀects of the expansion in public day care pro-
visions in Chile. I use the traditional reduced-form estimation of labor supply derived from the
maximization of a utility function U(c,l) increasing in consumption and leisure, subject to the
budget constraints: a) Consumption cannot exceed non-labor income, yNL, and labor income,
wh, less child care cost, ph,[ c = yNL +( w − p)h]; b)Hours of work, h, plus leisure, l, cannot
exceed total time, T [T = l+h]. In the case of public provision of day care, the net wage increases
from w − p to w for the amount of hours in which free care is provided. Therefore the intuition
tells us that the mother’s reservation wage goes down and she might be more willing to work.
However, from a theoretical point of view, we can distinguish three cases:
• Mothers that were not working previous to the policy, would face a substitution eﬀect
therefore making it more attractive to work;
• Mothers that were working full time (more hours than those provided by the free day care)
face an income eﬀect causing a reduction in the amount of hours oﬀered in the labor market;
and
• Mothers that were working part time (less hours than those provided by the free day care)
face both income and substitution eﬀects. Hence there is no clear prediction about the total
eﬀect on labor supply
10I thank the Ministry of Housing of Chile for the access to this data.
12A ﬁrst approach to estimate the impact of the child care expansion is to look at the labor
market behavior of the women that could be aﬀected by this policy. However, their behavior
could also be determined by other factors aﬀecting the national economy or by their individual
preferences. Therefore, I will take a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach looking at their change in
behavior between 2003 and 2008, relative to a group of women that should not be aﬀected by the
policy.
The treatment group is deﬁned by the target of the policy: women in the ﬁrst two quintiles
with children at most 2 years old. The control group is deﬁned as women with young children in
the higher income quintiles. As mentioned before, the periods taken into consideration to look at
the labor force participation are June 2003-2005 and June 2007-2008.
Targeted Not Targeted





















Following Donald and Lang (May 2007), I will use their two-step estimator to compute the
appropiate t-statistics and correctly test if there has been a change in female LFP after the day
care expansion started. To do so, the ﬁrst step regression is:
LFPit = α0 + α1Eit + α2EitD2004it + α3EitD2005it + α4EitD2007it + α5EitD2008it (2)
+ β1D2004ict + β2D2005ict + β3D2007ict + β3D2008ict + εit
where i denotes individuals and t denotes time. LFPit is the indicator of Labor Force Par-
ticipation of women i in year t; Eit is a dummy variable showing whether women i meets the
eligibility criteria; and D200Xit are dummy variables for each year in the sample (except 2003).
The coeﬃcient α1 is capturing the 2003 diﬀerential on LFP for eligible women. To recover
any other year diﬀerential, I need to add α1 and the corresponding α of the interaction between
eligibility and desired year dummy. For example, Diff2005 = α1 + α3 can be recovered.
For the second step the year diﬀerential is regressed on a constant and a post-reform dummy:
Difft = θ0 + θ1Post + ε (3)
and the signiﬁcance of the θ1 coeﬃcient is tested.
An additional limitation of this approach is the inability to control for personal characteristics
that may aﬀect the labor market participation. Hence, an improvement on the simple diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence estimator is to include other observable characteristics that may be inﬂuencing the
decision to enter the labor market.
Therefore the estimating equation becomes :
LFPit = X
￿
itβ + α1Eit + EitDY earitα2 + DY earitα3 + εit (4)
where i denotes individuals and t denotes time. LFPit is the indicator of Labor Force Partici-
pation of women i in year t; Xict is a vector of the women characteristics like, age, age square,
13years of schooling, cohabitant status, number of children between 2 and 6 years of age, non-labor
income and number of other female adults in the household; Eit is a dummy variable showing
if women i meets the eligibility criteria; and DY earit are dummy variables for each year in the
sample (except 2003).
A second approach is to use a standard Labor Force Participation (LFP) equation, and include
the increase in public child care supply availability at the county level as an additional regressor.
Therefore the estimating equation is :
LFPict = X
￿
ictβ + α0Dict + α1DictPoorict + α2Poorict + ηt + εict (5)
where i denotes individuals, c denotes counties and t denotes time. LFPict is the indicator
of Labor Force Participation of women i in county c and year t; Xict is a vector of the women
characteristics like, age, age square, years of schooling, cohabitant status, number of children be-
tween 2 and 6 years of age, non-labor income and number of other female adults in the household;
Dict is the availability of infant care, measured as the number of day care centers per squared
kilometer in the county or the number of spots available over the number of eligible infants in a
given county; Poorict is an indicator of eligibility for the program, in this case belonging to the
lowest two income quintiles. The quasi experiment I am using is the exogenous variation in the
number of day care centers, given by the governmental policy. Considering I am using repeated
cross-sectional data, I additionally control for time dummies, ηt and cluster at the county level.
Finally, εict represents the error term.
The parameter of interest is α1, which gives us the change in Labor Force Participation for
eligible women who faced the change in public day care availability.
6 Results
6.1 Mean Diﬀerences
As seen in section 4.1, Female Labor Force Participation rate is very low in the Chilean economy.
These statistics are even more striking among low income females. Looking at aggregate data
for Greater Santiago, we observe that the participation rate of poor women (Quintiles 1 and 2)
averaged 18.35% in 2002-2005, whereas the same ﬁgure was 57.98% for Quintiles 3-5. Comparing
the average before the public day care expansion (2003-2005) to after the expansion (2007-2008)
we see that it increases by 13 percentage points for eligible females compared to a rise of 6.63
percentage points among wealthier women.
Table 10: Female LFP by income level in Greater Santiago




Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey
Even though the percentage-point diﬀerence is almost double among eligible women, I do not
have statistical power to reject the null hypothesis of equality. Therefore it cannot be established
that there was an additional increase in the lower-income level women.
However, a better indicator of the eﬀect I am looking for is the trend of labor participation
among women with young children (0-2 years old). In order to test my hypothesis, I compute the
14average Labor Force Participation considering a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the treatment group. In
all cases I consider the period 2003-2005 as pre-reform and 2007-2008 post-reform. In the ﬁrst
case, I consider the formal deﬁnition of eligible families as those belonging to the ﬁrst two income
quintiles. Thereafter, I use the deﬁnition of poverty line and schooling level, and ﬁnally I split
the sample by children’s age.
Table 11: Diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates
Eligibility Mean Diﬀerence
Quintiles 1 and 2 6.44%
Quintiles 1 to 3 5.56%
Below poverty line 2.62%
Primary education 2.70%
Children’s age 2.19%
Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey
As can be seen in Table 11, there appears to be a positive impact on Labor Force Partic-
ipation. However, the magnitude of that impact ﬂuctuates depending on the deﬁnition of the
treatment group used. With the formal eligibility criteria I ﬁnd an increase of 6.44%. Consid-
ering the descriptive statistics presented in subsection 4.1, I expanded the treatment group to
mothers belonging to Quintiles 1 to 3, which slightly reduces the impact obtained with the formal
deﬁnition of eligibility (from 6,44% to 5.46%). If I deﬁne the treatment groups by schooling level,
I ﬁnd a 2.7% increase, and with the children’s age deﬁnition it reaches 2.19%.
However, even after performing the two-step procedure proposed by Donald and Lang (May 2007),
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences are established in LFP between eligible and non-eligible women. The
second stage parameters of the post-reform dummy with their corresponding standard errors are
reported in Table 12.
Table 12: Estimates on Post Reform dummy variables
Eligibility Post Reform
Quintiles 1 and 2 -0.02
( 0.16)
Quintiles 1 to 3 -0.01
(0.17)






Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Once mother’s characteristics are included as an additional control, the estimated diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimators become smaller, as reported in Table 13. When the eligibility criteria
are deﬁned by poverty line, the estimate even becomes negative. However, none of the estimated
diﬀerences appear to be signiﬁcant even after the two-stage procedure described before.
However, I need to be cautious with this analysis, because the sample size of the employment
survey does not allow us to look at more speciﬁc groups that could behave more homogenously.
15Table 13: Diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates with control variables
Eligibility Mean Diﬀerence
Quintiles 1 and 2 4.429%
Quintiles 1 to 3 1.569%
Below Poverty line -1.067%
Primary education -0.001%
Children’s age 0.464%
Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey
Therefore, I will move on the multivariate regression approach that considers county-level varia-
tion in the availability of public day cares, as described in Section 5.
6.2 Eﬀects on Labor Force Participation
Table 14 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the sample: mothers of
children, at most, two years old. Consistent with the characteristics of day care users presented
in Section 4.1, eligible mothers tend to have lower educational levels than non-eligible ones: 94%
of them reach high school, while almost 50% of non-eligible continue studying after high school.
The eligible women are also slightly younger and a higher fraction of them appears as head of
household. On the remaining variables there does not appear any important diﬀerence between
both groups.
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for women with children at most two years
Total Eligible Non-Eligible
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Schooling 10.39 4.85 8.22 4.56 11.36 4.92
dPrimary 0.16 0.36 0.26 0.44 0.12 0.33
dHigh School 0.60 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.53 0.50
Age 29.96 7.05 29.15 7.31 30.63 6.54
N◦ of children 2.31 1.18 2.36 1.15 2.23 1.20
Cohabitant 0.87 0.34 0.87 0.33 0.89 0.31
Head of HH 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22
Other female adults 1.16 0.43 1.10 0.38 1.16 0.44
LFP 0.48 0.50 0.28 0.45 0.48 0.50
N◦ obs 942 465 238
Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey, 2003-2008
Sample: Women between 15 and 45 years old with children at most two years old
Eligible deﬁned as belonging to income Quintiles 1 or 2
Non-Eligible deﬁned as belonging to income Quintiles 4 or 5
The baseline case deﬁnes eligibility by income quintiles. I estimate the eﬀect for the complete
period and for diﬀerent pairs of years. Table 15 shows the estimated parameters considering the
whole time period in columns (1) and (2) and only one year before (2005) and one year after
(2008) the policy change started in columns (3) and (4). Consistent with previous estimations
I ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of the mother’s age on their occupational status that is decreasing over
time. Similarly, being the head of household increases the probability of work, while being mar-
ried decreases it by a considerable amount. In relation to my variables of interest I observe that
a higher availability of day care, measured either by the relative number of spots (in columns
16(1) and (3)) or by the number of centers (columns (3) and (4)) has a positive impact on LFP.
However, the interactive term that reﬂects the impact of the policy on eligible families appears
to be negative for the ﬁrst indicator and not signiﬁcant for the second one when I consider the
whole period. Therefore, following this eligibility criteria I ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect. Consistent with the descriptive statistics, belonging to the lowest two income quintiles
(Poor) reduces the probability of participation.
In order to verify the possibility of an impact considering alternative deﬁnitions of the treat-
ment group, I split the sample by educational level. I deﬁne mothers with only primary education
as the treatment group, and mothers with higher education as the control group. I continue
restricting the sample to mothers with children at most two years of age. The coeﬃcients of the
interest parameters are reported in Table 16. Similar to the income eligibility criteria, there is a
positive eﬀect of the level of day care availability; however, I do not ﬁnd any additional eﬀect for
the treatment group.
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Table 15: Regression estimates on Female LFP, by income eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)***
Schooling 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00)* (0.01) (0.01)
Head of HH 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.32
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Any children 2-6 years 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohabitant==1 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.19
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.10)* (0.10)*
NLY -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)* (0.00)
Other female adults in HH 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04
(0.04)* (0.04)* (0.08) (0.09)




Poor -0.25 -0.29 -0.18 -0.26
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.08)** (0.09)***
N◦ Centers per KM2 0.10 0.19
(0.09) (0.13)
Center per KM*Poor -0.09 -0.20
(0.11) (0.19)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
I perform an alternative experiment considering the poor mothers with children at most two
years old as the treatment group, and poor mothers of children 4 and 5 years old as the control
11The complete regressions are presented in Table A.4.
17group. As we see in Table 17, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect either.
Table 16: Regression estimates on Female LFP, by schooling eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)




N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.06 -0.01
(0.07) (0.10)
Center per KM*Primary 0.06 0.04
(0.14) (0.25)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 17: Regression estimates on Female LFP, by children’s age eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N◦ Spots/N◦ of infants 0.16 0.66
(0.27) (0.39)*
N◦ Spots/N◦ of infants*Children2 -0.34 -0.95
(0.33) (0.43)**
N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.10 -0.22
(0.09) (0.11)**
Center per KM*Children2 0.08 0.16
(0.10) (0.18)
Observations 1,573 1,573 614 614
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
This could imply either that the impact is too low to be captured with this survey or that
there is really no elasticity to the availability of public day care supply. As mentioned before
this is consistent with alternative hypotheses. For example, it could be that the same mothers
were working before and after the policy change, and with this extra availability they are able
to substitute part of the day care arrangements they were using before. Another alternative
explanation is that even though new day care facilities are available, the mothers are not working
because of some cultural factors or because the time schedules are not compatible with their work
alternatives.
6.3 Eﬀects on Labor Supply
An alternative labor market outcome that has been documented in the literature are the eﬀects
on employment. Even if I do not ﬁnd an eﬀect on LFP but do ﬁnd one on employment, it would
imply that no extra women entered the labor force due to this policy, but that they were able to
accept a job. Following this approach, I report the probit results on employment. As we can see
in Table 18, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the treatment group.
18Table 18: Regression estimates on Female Employment, by income eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)




N◦ Centers per KM2 0.02 0.13
(0.08) (0.14)
Center per KM*Poor -0.05 -0.08
(0.09) (0.16)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
I also estimated the eﬀect on employment for the alternative deﬁnitions of treatment groups.
Tables A.6 and A.7 show that I do not ﬁnd any additional eﬀect for the alternative deﬁnitions of
treatment groups (schooling and children’s age).
6.4 Eﬀects on Hours Worked
Given I was not able to ﬁnd any eﬀect on employment I will test if there might be an impact on
hours worked by the already working mothers. To do so, I run an OLS regression of the hours
worked on the same set of characteristics used in the previous subsection.
Table 19: Regression estimates on Hours Worked, by income eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)




N◦ Centers per KM2 8.00 9.99
(16.74) (33.76)
Center per KM*Poor -16.07 -27.63
(20.07) (38.09)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
R-squared 0.316 0.311 0.269 0.259
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Even though my estimates have large standard errors, there appears to be a negative impact
on the hours worked. This might be evidence in favor of an income eﬀect among working mothers,
who can save spending on child care arrangements once the public day cares become available.
As we can see in Table 19, the negative eﬀect is only signiﬁcant with the indicator of number of
spots relative to eligible children (columns (1) and (3)).
Finally, I run the same regression considering the schooling level as the eligibility criteria and
as reported in Table A.9, and I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect.
197 Conclusions
This paper uses data of the Chilean public day care centers with their corresponding number of
vacancies to estimate the eﬀect this policy has on female labor force participation. Using the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach for quasi natural experiments, I ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on Labor
Force Participation of poor women to be 2.6-10 percent increase in the labor force of poor fam-
ilies. However, once I control for observable family and individual characteristics, I no longer
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the labor force participation, employment or hours of work of eligible
women. I perform robustness checks by looking at diﬀerent eligibility criteria considering the
mothers’ schooling level and the age of their children. I additionally look at the possible impact
of alternative labor outcomes as occupational status and hours worked, and I am not able to ﬁnd
a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect. I conclude that it is not possible yet to infer that this policy has had
the desired side eﬀect.
This could imply either that the impact is too low to be captured with this survey, or that
there is really no elasticity to the availability of public day care supply. As mentioned before,
this is consistent with alternative hypotheses. For example, it could be that the same mothers
were working before and after the policy change, and with this extra availability they are able to
substitute part of the day care arrangements they were using before. They might even be reducing
the hours of work given the income eﬀect of free public day care. An alternative explanation is
that even though new day care facilities are available, the mothers are not working because of
cultural factors, or because the time schedules of these day care facilities are not compatible with
their work alternatives.
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218 Appendix
Table A.1: Evolution of Public Day Care Centers and Spots
County 2005 2006 2007 Elegible Coverage
Centers Spots Centers Spots Centers Spots Population Rate
˜ Nu˜ noa 3 136 6 199 7 226 604 37.42%
La Reina 2 76 2 90 2 90 450 20.00%
Penalol´ en 8 261 9 370 17 631 2,408 26.20%
Macul 4 160 6 214 7 278 842 33.02%
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 3 87 6 140 8 192 1,170 16.41%
San Miguel 0 0 1 18 2 39 441 8.84%
San Joaqu´ ın 4 96 9 202 10 230 1,493 15.41%
La Granja 7 194 10 271 12 348 1,875 18.56%
San Ram´ on 3 100 6 176 8 275 2,471 11.13%
La Cisterna 0 0 0 0 2 56 783 7.15%
Lo Espejo 3 81 5 116 7 156 2,538 6.15%
El Bosque 4 160 8 308 8 326 2,376 13.72%
La Pintana 9 366 14 488 16 493 3,796 12.99%
San Bernardo 4 153 8 253 9 316 3,258 9.70%
Cerro Navia 5 197 8 277 9 326 2,759 11.82%
Pudahuel 4 141 7 250 7 299 2,734 10.94%
Lo Prado 4 160 4 160 5 193 1,146 16.84%
Cerrillos 1 28 3 104 3 104 676 15.38%
Maip´ u 5 160 8 268 9 311 8,394 3.71%
Renca 7 225 12 402 14 467 2,206 21.17%
Independencia 1 18 1 18 1 17 683 2.49%
Recoleta 7 288 9 339 10 418 1,051 39.77%
Huechuraba 6 230 9 317 10 355 1,595 22.26%
Quilicura 3 85 5 164 6 188 2,053 9.16%
Conchal´ ı 5 196 6 233 8 277 921 30.08%
Providencia 0 0 1 36 1 42 54 77.78%
Las Condes 4 128 4 166 5 182 356 51.12%
Vitacura 0 0 0 0 1 27 351 7.69%
Lo Barnechea 2 92 2 107 2 104 939 11.08%
Santiago 0 0 6 120 13 245 987 24.82%
Quinta Normal 2 74 4 139 4 135 1,513 8.92%
Estaci´ on Central 3 114 7 198 12 344 1,051 32.73%
La Florida 6 188 15 432 16 505 2,661 18.98%
Puente Alto 13 412 24 767 29 951 9,629 9.88%
Total 132 4,606 225 7,342 280 9,146 66,264 13.80%
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Nation Household Survey, CASEN
22Table A.2: Children 0 - 2 years old in 2006, by county
County Total Eligible Rate
˜ Nu˜ noa 2,818 604 21.4%
La Reina 1,927 450 23.4%
Penalol´ en 4,720 2,408 51.0%
Macul 2,269 842 37.1%
Pedro Aguirre Cerda 1,961 1,170 59.7%
San Miguel 1,421 441 31.0%
San Joaqu´ ın 2,267 1,493 65.9%
La Granja 2,853 1,875 65.7%
San Ram´ on 3,785 2,471 65.3%
La Cisterna 1,815 783 43.1%
Lo Espejo 3,583 2,538 70.8%
El Bosque 3,092 2,376 76.8%
La Pintana 4,956 3,796 76.6%
San Bernardo 7,088 3,258 46.0%
Cerro Navia 4,254 2,759 64.9%
Pudahuel 5,036 2,734 54.3%
Lo Prado 2,913 1,146 39.3%
Cerrillos 992 676 68.1%
Maip´ u 17,700 8,394 47,4%
Renca 3,558 2,206 62.0%
Independencia 1,812 683 37.7%
Recoleta 2,738 1,051 38.4%
Huechuraba 2,292 1,595 69.6%
Quilicura 4,457 2,053 46.1%
Conchal´ ı 2,605 921 35.4%
Providencia 570 54 9.5%
Las Condes 4,388 356 8.1%
Vitacura 2,412 351 14.6%
Lo Barnechea 1,949 939 48.2%
Santiago 5,150 987 19.2%
Quinta Normal 2,322 1,513 65.2%
Estaci´ on Central 2,388 1,051 44.0%
La Florida 9,354 2,661 28.4%
Puente Alto 16,933 9,629 56,9%
Total 138,378 66,264 TOTAL
Source: Author’s calculation based on the Nation Household Survey, CASEN
23Table A.3: Estimated coeﬃcients on Female LFP, by schooling eligibility criteria
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Head of HH 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.27
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Any children 2-6 years -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohabitant==1 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.17
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.11) (0.11)
NLY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other female adults in HH 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.06
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.08) (0.08)




Primary Schooling -0.19 -0.14 -0.13 -0.06
(0.07)*** (0.04)*** (0.15) (0.11)
N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.06 -0.01
(0.07) (0.10)
Center per KM*Primary 0.06 0.04
(0.14) (0.25)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
24Table A.4: Estimated coeﬃcients on Female LFP, by children’s age eligibility criteria
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.03)*
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)* (0.00)*
Schooling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Head of HH 0.46 0.46 0.38 0.39
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.08)*** (0.07)***
Children at most 2 years -0.06 -0.12 0.06 -0.11
(0.05) (0.04)*** (0.08) (0.07)
Any children 2-6 years 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Cohabitant==1 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
NLY -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Other female adults in HH 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.15
(0.04)* (0.04)* (0.08)* (0.08)*
N◦ Spots/N◦ of infants 0.16 0.66
(0.27) (0.39)*
N◦ Spots/N◦ of infants*Children2 -0.34 -0.95
(0.33) (0.43)**
N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.10 -0.22
(0.09) (0.11)**
Center per KM*Children2 0.08 0.16
(0.10) (0.18)
Observations 1,573 1,573 614 614
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
25Table A.5: Regression estimates on Female Employment, by income eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Schooling 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Head of HH 0.29 0.29 0.18 0.18
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)** (0.08)**
Any children 2-6 years -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohabitant==1 -0.18 -0.18 -0.22 -0.22
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.10)** (0.10)**
NLY -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)* (0.00)
Other female adults in HH 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)




Poor -0.35 -0.36 -0.22 -0.31
(0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)***
N◦ Centers per KM2 0.02 0.13
(0.08) (0.14)
Center per KM*Poor -0.05 -0.08
(0.09) (0.16)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
26Table A.6: Regression estimates on Female Employment, by schooling eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.12
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Schooling
Head of HH 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.13
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)* (0.08)*
Any children 2-6 years -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Cohabitant==1 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.11)* (0.11)*
NLY 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other female adults in HH 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)




Primary Schooling -0.21 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10
(0.07)*** (0.05)*** (0.14) (0.10)
N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.14 -0.01
(0.07)* (0.10)
Center per KM*Primary 0.15 0.13
(0.15) (0.26)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
27Table A.7: Regression estimates on Female Employment, by children’s age
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.09
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)***
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Schooling -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Head of HH 0.37 0.38 0.23 0.24
(0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)***
Children at most 2 years -0.07 -0.09 0.08 -0.06
(0.05) (0.03)*** (0.07) (0.05)
Any Children 2-6 years 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
Cohabitant==1 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.18
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.09)** (0.09)**
NLY -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Other female adults in HH 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)




N◦ Centers per KM2 -0.09 -0.21
(0.08) (0.09)**
Center per KM*Children2 0.05 0.20
(0.09) (0.12)
Observations 1573 1573 614 614
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
28Table A.8: Regression estimates on Hours Worked, by income eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 2.83 3.01 9.43 10.25
(1.63)* (1.65)* (4.31)** (4.40)**
Age squared -0.04 -0.04 -0.12 -0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)*
Schooling -0.07 0.06 -0.29 0.03
(0.27) (0.23) (0.93) (0.82)
Head of HH -1.42 -0.72 3.67 4.55
(4.73) (4.85) (10.78) (11.50)
Children at most 2 years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Any children 2-6 years -0.21 -0.30 0.99 -0.37
(3.06) (3.07) (9.13) (9.12)
Cohabitant==1 -9.53 -9.60 -36.03 -35.91
(7.09) (7.21) (19.15)* (19.46)*
NLY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other female adults in HH 1.53 1.07 3.09 0.76
(3.49) (3.68) (7.57) (8.58)
N
◦ Spots/N




Poor 2.25 -2.80 -5.70 -16.03
(4.10) (4.59) (10.52) (10.60)
N
◦ Centers per KM2 8.00 9.99
(16.74) (33.76)
Center per KM*Poor -16.07 -27.63
(20.07) (38.09)
Constant -46.12 -46.29 -74.44 -77.57
(21.34)** (21.95)** (52.48) (54.33)
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
R-squared 0.316 0.311 0.269 0.259
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
29Table A.9: Regression estimates on Hours Worked, by schooling eligibility
Whole Sample Years 2005 and 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 3.22 3.44 10.36 11.48
(1.56)** (1.60)** (3.98)** (4.14)***
Age squared -0.04 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)* (0.07)**
Head of HH -2.03 -1.86 0.88 1.18
(4.66) (4.79) (11.36) (11.82)
Children at most 2 years 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Any children 2-6 years -0.52 -0.71 -0.11 -1.83
(3.08) (3.02) (9.63) (9.15)
Cohabitant==1 -10.15 -10.26 -35.48 -35.47
(7.15) (7.20) (19.48)* (19.51)*
NLY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00)* (0.00)* (0.00) (0.00)*
Other female adults in HH 1.63 1.49 3.70 2.13
(3.73) (3.78) (7.97) (8.30)




Primary Schooling 2.39 -2.35 2.30 -2.10
(4.08) (4.17) (14.83) (12.73)
N◦ Centers per KM2 -3.98 -10.09
(9.52) (20.78)
Center per KM*Primary 5.79 2.52
(16.19) (41.08)
Constant -52.93 -52.55 -166.65 -171.61
(20.64)** (21.54)** (52.45)*** (55.03)***
Observations 1,517 1,517 529 529
R-squared 0.309 0.307 0.249 0.244
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
30